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States with private correlations but little or no distillable entanglement were recently reported.
Here, we consider the secure distribution of such states, i.e., the situation when an adversary gives
two parties such states and they have to verify privacy. We present a protocol which enables the
parties to extract from such untrusted states an arbitrarily long and secure key, even though the
amount of distillable entanglement of the untrusted states can be arbitrarily small.
Suppose Alice and Bob shared a maximally entangled
state, say, an ebit 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). Clearly, they can gen-
erate a private key directly by measuring their state in
the Z-basis, without any classical post processing. Are
there other types of states with similar key-generating
ability? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. Reference [1]
gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a state to
generate a key by a direct measurement in the computa-
tional basis – it must be some twisted version of a maxi-
mally entangled state called the pbit (private bit).
Now suppose Alice and Bob are unsure what state
they’re sharing. A striking feature of entanglement is
that, it can be verified and distilled [2]. Thus, Alice and
Bob can first generate near-perfect ebits and then a pri-
vate key. The best known means to achieve quantum
key distribution (QKD) via noisy, untrusted channels or
states is distillation of ebits. It is then natural to try to
go beyond this, by asking whether noisy and untrusted
pbits can similarly be distilled or verified.
The distillation of pbits was consider in [1, 3] when
Alice and Bob know they share identical copies of some
quantum states. However, can we achieve QKD with
noisy or untrusted pbits? In this paper, we provide a
positive answer by the explicit construction of QKD pro-
tocols based on noisy pbits and by proving their un-
conditional security (against the most general attack al-
lowed by quantum mechanics). The protocol essentially
involves checking bit and phase errors, with phase er-
rors being checked using a sub-linear number of ebits.
In the case when an adversary claims to give the parties
copies of ideal private key, which is always distillable,
this sub-linear number of ebits can be obtained by ap-
plying an initial distillation protocol on some of the key
states. However, there are also states which approximate
pbits, yet contain no distillable entanglement [1]. For
these states, our protocol requires a sub-linear amount
of ebits as an extra resource.
We will begin with a review of known properties of
pbits. We then introduce the protocol, and prove its
security. Our security proof also relies on the compos-
ability of distillation protocols, and we provide a proof
in the Ben-Or-Mayers model [4].
Private states, twisting, and their properties
Suppose Alice and Bob share a quantum state ρAB
and the eavesdropper Eve has the purification (with her
reduced density matrix denoted by ρE). We say that
ρAB contains ideal security if and only if there is a local
measurement taking it to some ideal ccq state
ρidealccq =
d∑
i
1
d
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ρE , (1)
signifying that Alice and Bob each has a copy of the
key i that is uncorrelated with Eve. The class of states
containing ideal security in this sense has been fully char-
acterized in the following way:
Theorem 1 [1, 3] Any state ρABA′B′ of a Hilbert space
HA⊗HA′ ⊗HB ⊗HB′ with dimensions dA = d, dB = d,
and arbitrary dA′ , dB′ , gives an ideal ccq state after mea-
surement in the computational basis on the AB subsystem
if and only if
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|ii〉〈jj|AB ⊗ UiρA′B′U
†
j (2)
where ρA′B′ is an arbitrary state of the subsystem A
′B′
and the Ui’s are arbitrary unitary transformations.
We will refer to a state of the form (2) as a “private
state” or a “gamma state” or a “pdit” (and pbit when
d = 2). Following the convention of [3], we will call
subsystem AB the “key part” of the pdit and A′B′ its
“shield.” These definitions are summarized in Figure 1.
Due to Theorem 1, the distillable keyKD of a quantum
state σ can naturally be defined as the maximum ratio of
the logarithm of the dimension d of the output pdit to the
number of copies of σ used, and the ratio is maximized
over asymptotic LOCC protocols [1, 3].
Recall that any private state is a “twisted” maximally
entangled state [1, 3], with the twisting operation defined
as
U (2) =
∑
ij
|ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ U
†
ijA′B′ (3)
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FIG. 1: A private state ρABA′B′ with purifying system E.
The “key part” (AB) after a complete von Neumann mea-
surement gives an ideal key, which is secure due to the fact
that Alice and Bob hold the “shield” part (A′B′).
where Uii = Ui as defined in (2). Since twisting is re-
versible, we can see this in reverse: any pdit can be
turned into a maximally entangled state on AB and some
(global) ancillary state ρA′B′ on A
′B′ by a certain twist-
ing operation. More formally:
Observation 1 Consider any private state ρABA′B′ of
the form (2) and the twisting defined as in (3). U (2) is
called a “global untwisting” – it takes ρABA′B′ in (2) into
a state
P+ ⊗ ρA′B′ (4)
called the basic pdit, where P+ =
∑d−1
ij=0
1
d |ii〉〈jj| is a
maximally entangled state on AB and ρA′B′ is the same
as in (2). The same state change can also result from
applying a “local untwisting” defined as
U (1) =
d−1∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|B ⊗ U
†
iiA′B′ . (5)
Note, that if Bob had access to A′ he can transform
a private state into a basic pdit using local untwisting
(thus the name “local”). The global and local untwistings
are respectively subscripted by (2) and (1) (labeling the
number of control systems). Together with the obvious
fact that exact teleportation of a system can be viewed as
an identity map on it, we have the following observation:
Observation 2 For any state ρABA′B′ , the composition
of (i) teleportation of A′ to Bob’s side and (ii) local un-
twisting on BB′A′ commutes with measurement in the
computational basis on AB.
A final property of pbits to review is as follows:
Proposition 1 [5] For any private state ρ, ED(ρ)>0.
Remark This only holds for exact pbits, since one can
approximate pbits with bound entangled states.
This concludes our summary for the known results
on private states in the promise scenario in which Al-
ice and Bob know that they share multiple copies of a
certain state. We now switch to the general scenario.
We will first describe our main protocol for QKD using
noisy pbits, and then establish its unconditional security
against the most general attack by Eve.
The main protocol, M
There are six major steps in the main protocol:
• State distribution
Alice and Bob request n copies of a certain private
state γABA′B′ ∈ B(C
d⊗Cd⊗CdA′⊗CdB′ ) given by (2). We
consider the most general attack where the γ states are
distributed by Eve. Therefore Alice and Bob may have
an arbitrary joint state over all n systems. Without loss
of generality, we take dA′ ≤ dB′ and assume compression
has already been performed on subsystem A′ to reduce
its dimension.
• Partial distillation
Alice and Bob randomly choose k out of n systems
and run a distillation protocol that would return (m ×
log dA′) + t [8] ebits if the input were indeed γ
⊗k. Alice
and Bob estimate the quality of m× log dA′ of those un-
trusted ebits using the other t, say, using the Lo-Chau
protocol [9]. Here, t is based on a quality parameter
0 < ǫ < 1, such that they abort the protocol with high
probability if the fidelity between the untrusted and ideal
ebits is less than 1− ǫ.
• Random sampling, untwisting, phase-error estimation
Upon passing the test, Alice and Bob will have n − k
systems and m× log dA′ distilled ebits. They pick a ran-
dom subset ofm out of n−k systems, and Alice teleports
the m A′ subsystems to Bob using the m × log dA′ dis-
tilled ebits. To each teleported A′ (together with his
local corresponding system BB′) Bob applies the local
untwisting U (1) for γ, as in (5), to obtain m “untwisted”
systems. On the m “untwisted” systems Alice and Bob
measure σx on A and B and share the results to effect
a measurement of [σx ⊗ σx]AB ⊗ IA′B′ and estimate the
phase-flip error rate ex.
• Random sampling and bit-error estimation
They pick another random subset ofm out of n−k−m
systems and measure σz, share their results, and effec-
tively measure [σz⊗σz]AB⊗IA′B′ . This time, they obtain
the bit-flip error rate ez.
• Raw key generation
If both ex and ez are reasonably small, Alice and Bob
generate a raw key from the n − k − 2m remaining sys-
tems by measuring [σz ⊗ σz]AB ⊗ IA′B′ on each of them.
Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
• Error correction and privacy amplification
3On the raw key, Alice and Bob perform the two-way
Gottesman-Lo classical error correction and privacy am-
plification [10] – repeated concatenation of BXOR and
three-qubit phase code followed by one-way error correc-
tion/privacy amplification (ec/pa) procedure.
We comment on some aspects of this protocol. First,
Alice and Bob can perform any distillation protocol, even
those assuming tensor power input state γ⊗k (e.g. the
“hashing” protocol of [11]). This is because having per-
formed such protocol Alice and Bob subsequently check
the quality of the distilled states. Second, we do not
have to assume that the specific γABA′B′ is distillable –
instead, it is guaranteed by proposition (1) for all private
states. Third, in the phase-error estimation, the local
untwisting operation can be replaced by any global un-
twisting. While these two options are equivalent for per-
fect private states, they are generally different outside of
the promise scenario. The global untwisting requires the
extra teleportation of the A subsystem and thus the dis-
tillation of m× log d additional ebits, but can give higher
rate than using local untwisting (e.g. as in case of the
mixture of two orthogonal private states [12]).
Proof of unconditional security of main protocol
Before stating the proof, we discuss the ideas behind it.
The unconditional security of M is by reduction to that
of the Lo-Chau protocol [9] based on entanglement purifi-
cation. This reduction is possible because private states
are “twisted maximally entangled states.” Thus, the first
step in the proof is to realize that, if Alice and Bob could
(locally) untwist all n systems, Alice and Bob share some
noisy maximally entangled states on the AB subsystems,
and standard techniques [9, 10, 13] apply so that the
scheme is secure. The second step is to realize that Alice
and Bob do not need to untwist most of the systems, ex-
cept for those used in phase error estimation, and those
are indeed untwisted in the main protocol M . This is
because the untwisting is followed by the entanglement
purification schemes and then measurements [9, 10, 13],
a sequence of operations that can be replaced by mea-
surements followed by classical postprocessing. But by
observation 2, the measurements can be done before un-
twisting, which is then unnecessary. These replacement
are security-preserving, so that we obtain the desired se-
curity of the main protocol.
For clarity we will first assume Alice and Bob per-
form errorless teleportation and local untwisting, and
then consider the case when these operations are only
performed with certain fidelity.
(i) The case of ideal quantum operations
• Security of fully untwisted protocol M1 from [10]
Let us first consider another protocol M1 that dif-
fers from the main protocol only by an additional step
of untwisting (teleporting A′ and local untwisting) the
n− k −m systems before the measurements in bit-error
estimation and raw key generation. We now show that
M1 is unconditionally secure. Since Alice and Bob have
performed all untwisting operations inM1, they can trace
out the A′B′ subsystems, which is equivalent to giving
these subsystems to Eve and can only decrease secu-
rity. Thus, without loss of generality, the input to M1
can be taken to be 2-qubit noisy maximally entangled
states, and results based on entanglement purification
procedures are directly applicable. In particular, using
[9], if the bit and phase error rates are well estimated,
the appropriate entanglement purification procedure will
give a secure key. The efficient error estimation of [14]
provides good estimate of error rates that would have
occured if the rest of states were measured along the
Bell basis. Thus, after estimating the error rates, Alice
and Bob could apply an appropriate two-way distillation
procedure and obtain a secure key by measuring in bit
basis. Now, [10] also states that this can be done by
first measuring in bit basis, and then performing ec/pa,
which gives our M1 protocol. Since the Gottesman-Lo
procedure assures a secure key, we conclude that M1 is
unconditionally secure.
• Security of main protocol M from that of M1
Recall that M and M1 only differ in the additional
untwisting on the systems used in the bit-error estimation
and the raw-key generation steps. We now show that the
extra untwisting is unnecessary for the security of M1.
Observation 2 tells us that untwisting commutes with
measurement in the computation basis. Hence it cannot
change measurement outcomes obtained in the bit-error
estimation step and the raw key generation steps, and
thus the values of the estimated bit-error rate and the
raw key. It follows that untwisting of these n − k − m
systems does not effect the value of the final key and it is
unnecessary. Thus M differs from M1 only by omitting
the necessary untwisting, and its security follows from
that of M1.
This ends the proof of unconditional security of the
main protocol in case of ideal operations of teleportation
and untwisting.
(ii) The case of imperfect quantum operations
We now consider the case when Alice and Bob share
the maximally entangled state and can perform telepor-
tation and local untwisting only up to some confidence
level. In other word, we assume that
‖σ − P+‖tr < ǫ (6)
∀ρ ‖Λ
noisy
te (ρ)− Λ
ideal
te (ρ)‖ ≤ ǫ1 (7)
∀ρ ‖Λ
noisy
untw (ρ)− Λ
ideal
untw(ρ)‖ ≤ ǫ2 (8)
where, as before, P+ is the projector onto a maximally
entangled state (of appropriate dimension), and σ is the
state produced by the imperfect distillation, Λidealte de-
notes perfect teleportation of A′ and Λnoisyte the actual
transformation accomplished by Alice and Bob. ǫ,ǫ1,ǫ2,
4are exponential decaying functions in n. Similar nota-
tion holds for the local untwisting operation in (8). We
have assumed negligible errors in other operations, such
as measurements.
Note that the estimate of the bit error rate is unaf-
fected by the above errors (6)-(8). Now, we show that
if the erroneous operations have bounded errors as de-
scribed above, the probability is small that they observe
a phase error rate e′x different from what they would have
obtained (ex) using ideal operations. This can be proved
directly or by using a general composability result [4].
In essence, the composability result [4] guarantees the
following in the Ben-Or-Mayers model: Consider a pro-
tocol π that uses a certain ideal resource κ and achieves
security quantified by a security parameter ǫpi (this quan-
tifies the level of insecurity, but we will not go into the
definition). Suppose there is a subprotocol κ′ providing
the resource κ with security parameter ǫκ′ . Then, the
protocol π′ that uses κ′ (instead of κ) will have security
parameter ǫpi′ ≤ ǫpi + ǫκ′ .
Thus, without loss of generality, we can analyze a vari-
ation of the main protocol that uses ideal ebits instead
of σ obtained from imperfect distillation. If this new
protocol is secure, so is the original one (up to a degra-
dation of ǫ in the security parameter). In particular,
Eve could have jointly attacked the imperfect distillation
procedure and subsequent steps in the main protocol,
and the composability result still applies in the Ben-Or-
Mayers model. It then remains to consider imperfect
operations (7) and (8).
Let ρin be the state of the n systems distributed
in the first step of the main protocol, ρout =
Λnoisyuntw (Λ
noisy
te (ρin)), and U
(1) be the ideal local untwist-
ing defined by γ. By the invariance of norm under unitary
rotation and by the triangle inequality we obtain
‖U (1)ρinU
(1)† − ρout‖tr ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2. (9)
The same procedure consisting of measurements and clas-
sical postprocessing is then applied to U (1)ρinU
(1)† in the
ideal case, and to ρout in Alice and Bob’s imperfect proto-
col, leading to the ideal and actual phase error estimates
ex and e
′
x. Since the trace norm can only decrease under
this procedure, the trace distance between the distribu-
tion of ex and e
′
x is at most ǫ1 + ǫ2, as we have set out
to prove. This ends the proof of unconditional security
of the most general version of the main protocol.
Distilling entanglement versus distilling uncondi-
tionally secure key
We will comment now on the distilled/distillable entan-
glement in the context of our main protocol. We denote
K
u,M
D (γ) as the amount of key obtained in main proto-
col (M) when Alice and Bob demand n copies of pdit
γ given that the joint state passes error estimation step.
We consider also the amount of entanglement distilled in
that protocol denoted as EMD (γ).
• Distilled entanglement versus distilled secure key
For the main protocol one has for any pdit γ:
EMD (γ) ≈ 0. (10)
This comes from the logarithmical sample size s =
O(log d logn) needed to estimate phase error rate in the
efficient protocol of Lo-Chau-Ardehali [14]. Thus the
amount of distilled entanglement per input copy ap-
proaches zero with increasing n. On the other hand the
value of Ku,MD (γ) = c is nonzero by definition.
• Distillable entanglement versus distilled secure key
We now compare the distillable entanglement of pdit γ
with the distillable unconditionally secure key. Below we
give an example of the states showing Ku,MD (γ) can be
arbitrarily greater than ED(γ). It is based on the same
state for which one has KD(γ) > ED(γ) [1, 3].
Example Consider the pbit γABA′B′ ∈ B(C
2 ⊗ C2 ⊗
Cd ⊗ Cd) of the form [1]:
γABA′B′ = p|ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ρs + (1− p)|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ ρa (11)
where p = 12 (1 +
1
d) and ρs/a are normalized projectors
onto symmetric/antisymmetric subspace. One has for
this state ED(γ0) ≤ log(1+
1
d ) [1]. This leads to the con-
clusion that there are states for which the gap between
distillable entanglement and distillable unconditionally
secure key is arbitrarily high:
K
u,M
D (γ
⊗ log d
0 ) ≥ c log d→d ∞ (12)
ED(γ
⊗ log d
0 ) ≤ log d log(1 +
1
d
)→d 0 (13)
where in the second inequality we have used additivity
of log-negativity measure, which is an upper bound on
distillable entanglement [7].
In summary, we introduce protocols for QKD based
on noisy pbits, which are a generalization of singlets. We
have found that one can still distill a key in the adversary
model even when the distillable entanglement is made
arbitrarily small. Notice that pbits are the most general
type of states that can give a secure key. Therefore, our
work generalizes QKD to the most general type of initial
states.
A question which arises is whether a truly prepare-and-
measure scheme exists which does not use the teleporta-
tion step. One would thus be able to extract a verifiable
secure key from bound entangled states (i.e. sates which
have strictly zero distillable entanglement). A protocol
for doing this using quantum tomography was given in
[1], however a security proof was not given. Such a proof
will be the subject of a future publication. Finally, we
note that in the case of noisy pbits, the untwisting op-
eration in our protocol is not known to be optimal (nor
proven suboptimal).
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